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Abstract. While research on iterated revision is predominant in the
field of iterated belief change, the class of iterated contraction operators
received more attention in recent years. In this article, we examine a
non-prioritized generalisation of iterated contraction. In particular, the
class of weak decrement operators is introduced, which are operators
that by multiple steps achieve the same as a contraction. Inspired by
Darwiche and Pearl’s work on iterated revision the subclass of decrement
operators is defined. For both, decrement and weak decrement operators,
postulates are presented and for each of them a representation theorem
in the framework of total preorders is given. Furthermore, we present
two sub-types of decrement operators.
Keywords: belief revision, belief contraction, non-prioritized change,
gradual change, forgetting, decrement operator
1 Introduction
Changing beliefs in a rational way in the light of new information is one of
the core abilities of an agent - and thus one of the main concerns of artificial
intelligence. The established AGM theory [1] deals with desirable properties
of rational belief change. The AGM approach provides properties for different
types of belief changes. If new beliefs are incorporated into an agent’s beliefs
while maintaining consistency, this is called a revision. Expansion adds a belief
unquestioned to an agent’s beliefs, and contraction removes a belief from an
agent’s beliefs. Building upon the characterisations of these kinds of changes and
the underlying principle of minimal change, the theory fanned out in different
directions and sub-fields.
The field of iterated belief revision examines the properties of belief revision
operators which, due to their nature, can be applied iteratively. In this sub-field,
one of the most influential articles is the seminal paper [7] by Darwiche and
Pearl (DP), establishing the insight that belief sets are not a sufficient repre-
sentation for iterated belief revision. An agent has to encode more information
about her belief change strategy into her epistemic state - where the revision
strategy deeply corresponds with conditional beliefs. This requires additional
postulates that guarantee intended behaviour in forthcoming changes. The com-
mon way of encoding, also established by Darwiche and Pearl [7], is an extension
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2 Sauerwald and Beierle
of Katsuno and Mendelzon’s characterisation of AGM revision in terms of plau-
sibility orderings [12], where it is assumed that the epistemic states contain an
order over worlds (or interpretations).
Similar work has been done in recent years for iterated contraction. Chopra,
Ghose, Meyer and Wong [6] contributed postulates for contraction on epistemic
states. Caridroit, Konieczny and Marquis [4] provided postulates for contraction
in propositional logic and a characterisation with plausibility orders in the style
of Katsuno and Mendelzon. By this characterisation, the main characteristic of
a contraction with α is that the worlds of the previous state remain plausible
and that the most plausible counter-models of α become plausible.
However, in the sub-field of non-prioritised belief change, or more specifically,
in the field of gradual belief change much work remains to be done on contrac-
tion. An important generalisation of iterated revision operators are the class of
improvement operators by Konieczny and Pino Pérez [14], which achieve the
state of an revision by multiple steps in a gradual way. These kind of changes
where intensively studied by Konieczny, Pino Pérez, Booth, Fermé and Gres-
pan [3, 13]. A counterpart of improvement operators for the case of contraction
is missing. This article fills this gap. We investigate the contraction analogon to
improvement operators, which we call decrement operators. The leading idea is
to examine a class of operators which lead, after enough consecutive applications,
to the same states as an (iterative) contraction would do.
The research presented in this paper is also motivated by the quest for a
formalisation of forgetting operators within the field of knowledge representation
and reasoning (KRR). In a recent survey article by Eiter and Kern-Isberner [8]
the connection between contraction and forgetting of a belief is dealt with from
a KRR point of view. Steps towards a general framework for kinds of forgetting
in common-sense based belief management, revealing links to well-known KRR
methods, are taken in [2]. However, for the fading out of rarely used beliefs
that takes places in humans gradually over time, or for the change of routines,
e.g. in established workflows, often requiring many iterations and the intentional
forgetting of the previous routines, counterparts in the formal methods of KRR
are missing. With our work on decrement operators, we provide some basic
building blocks that may prove useful for developing a formalisation of these
psychologically inspired forgetting operations.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are1:
– Postulates for operators which allow one to perform contractions gradually.
– Representation theorems for these classes in the framework or epistemic
states and total preorders.
– Define two special types of decrement operators.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the re-
quired background on belief change. Section 3 introduces the main idea and the
postulates along with a representation theorem for weak decrement operators.
In Section 4 the weak decrement operators are restricted by DP-like iteration
1 This version of the paper contains the full proofs.
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postulates, leading to the class of decrement operators; we give also a represen-
tation theorem for the class of decrement operators. In Section 5 two special
types of decrement operators are specified. We close the paper with a discussion
and point out future work in Section 6.
2 Background
LetΣ be a propositional signature. The propositional language LΣ is the smallest
set, such that a ∈ LΣ for every a ∈ LΣ and ¬α ∈ LΣ , α ∧ β, α ∨ β ∈ LΣ if
α, β ∈ LΣ . We omit often Σ and write L instead of LΣ . We write formulas in L
with lower Greek letters α, β, γ, . . ., and propositional variables with lower case
letters a, b, c, . . . ∈ Σ. The set of propositional interpretations Ω, also called set of
worlds, is identified with the set of corresponding complete conjunctions over Σ.
Propositional entailment is denoted by |=, with JαK we denote the set of models
of α, and Cn(α) = {β | α |= β} is the deductive closure of α. This is lifted to a set
X by defining Cn(X) = {β | X |= β}. For two sets of formulas X,Y we say X is
equivalent to Y with respect to the formula α, writtenX =α Y , if Cn(X∪{α}) =
Cn(Y ∪{α})2. For two sets of interpretations Ω1, Ω2 ⊆ Ω we say Ω1 is equivalent
to Ω2 with respect to the formula α, written Ω1 =α Ω2, if Ω1 and Ω2 contain
the same set of models of α, i.e. {ω1 ∈ Ω1 | ω1 |= α} = {ω2 ∈ Ω2 | ω2 |= α}. For
a set of worlds Ω′ ⊆ Ω and a total preorder ≤ (reflexive and transitive relation)
over Ω, we denote with min(Ω′,≤) = {ω | ω ∈ Ω′ and ∀ω′ ∈ Ω′ ω ≤ ω′} the
set of all worlds in the lowest layer of ≤ that are elements in Ω′. For a total
preorder ≤, we denote with < its strict variant, i.e. x < y iff x ≤ y and y 6≤ x;
with  the direct successor variant, i.e. x  y iff x < y and there is no z such
that x < z < y; and we write x ' y iff x ≤ y and y ≤ x.
2.1 Epistemic States and Belief Changes
Every agent is equipped with an epistemic state, sometimes also called belief
state, that maintains all necessary information for her belief apparatus. With
E we denote the set of all epistemic states. Without defining what a epistemic
state is, we assume that for every epistemic state Ψ ∈ E we can obtain the set
of plausible sentences Bel (Ψ) ⊆ L of Ψ , which is deductively closed. We write
Ψ |= α iff α ∈ Bel (Ψ) and we define JΨK = {ω | ω |= α for each α ∈ Bel (Ψ)}. A
belief change operator over L is a (left-associative) function ◦ : E × L → E . We
denote with Ψ ◦n α the n-times application of α by ◦ to Ψ [14].
Darwiche and Pearl [7] propose that an epistemic state ψ should be equipped
with an ordering≤Ψ of the worlds (interpretations), where the compatibility with
Bel (Ψ) is ensured by the so-called faithfulness. Based on the work of Katsuno and
2 Cn(X∪{α}) matches belief expansion with α on belief sets. However, in the context
here, the context of iterative changes, we understand this purely technically. The
problem of expansion in this context is more complex [9].
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Medelezon [12], a mapping Ψ 7→≤Ψ is called faithful assignment if the following
is satisfied [7]:
if ω1 ∈ JΨK and ω2 ∈ JΨK, then ω1 'Ψ ω2
if ω1 ∈ JΨK and ω2 /∈ JΨK, then ω1 <Ψ ω2
Konieczny and Pino Pérez give a stronger variant of faithful assignments for
iterated belief change [14], which ensures that the mapping Ψ 7→≤Ψ is compatible
with the belief change operator with respect to syntax independence.
Definition 1 (Strong Faithful Assignment [14]). Let ◦ be a belief change
operator. A function Ψ 7→≤Ψ that maps each epistemic state to a total preorder
on interpretations is said to be a strong faithful assigment with respect to ◦ if:
if ω1 ∈ JΨK and ω2 ∈ JΨK, then ω1 'Ψ ω2(SFA1)
if ω1 ∈ JΨK and ω2 /∈ JΨK, then ω1 <Ψ ω2(SFA2)
if α1 ≡ β1, . . . , αn ≡ βn, then ≤Ψ◦α1◦...◦αn=≤Ψ◦β1◦...◦βn(SFA3)
We will make use of strong faithful assignments for the characterisation theorems.
2.2 Iterated Contraction
Postulates for AGM contraction in the framework of epistemic states were given
by Chopra, Ghose, Meyer and Wong [6] and by Konieczny and Pino Pérez [15].
We give here the formulation by Chropra et al. [6]:
Bel (Ψ − α) ⊆ Bel (Ψ)(C1)
if α /∈ Bel (Ψ) , then Bel (Ψ) ⊆ Bel (Ψ − α)(C2)
if α 6≡ >, then α /∈ Bel (Ψ − α)(C3)
Bel (Ψ) ⊆ Cn(Bel (Ψ − α) ∪ α)(C4)
if α ≡ β, then Bel (Ψ − α) = Bel (Ψ − β)(C5)
Bel (Ψ − α) ∩ Bel (Ψ − β) ⊆ Bel (Ψ − (α ∧ β))(C6)
if β /∈ Bel (Ψ − (α ∧ β)) , then Bel (Ψ − (α ∧ β)) ⊆ Bel (Ψ − β)(C7)
For an explanation of these postulates we refer to the article of Caridroit et
al. [4]. A characterisation in terms of total preorders on epistemic states is given
by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (AGM Contraction for Epistemic State [15]). A belief
change operator − fulfils the postulates (C1) to (C7) if and only if there is a
faithful assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ such that:
(1) JΨ − αK = JΨK ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ )
In addition to the postulates (C1) to (C7), Konieczny and Pino Pérez give DP-
like postulates for intended iteration behaviour of contraction [15]. In the fol-
lowing, we call these class of operators iterated contraction operators, which are
characterized by the following proposition.
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Proposition 2 (Iterated Contraction [15]). Let − be a belief change opera-
tor − which satisfies (C1) to (C7). Then − is an iterated contraction operator
if and only if there exists a faithful assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ such that (1) holds and
the following is satisfied:
if ω1, ω2 ∈ JαK, then ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 ⇔ ω1 ≤Ψ−α ω2
if ω1, ω2 ∈ J¬αK, then ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 ⇔ ω1 ≤Ψ−α ω2
if ω1 ∈ J¬αK and ω2 ∈ JαK, then ω1 <Ψ ω2 ⇒ ω1 <Ψ−α ω2
if ω1 ∈ J¬αK and ω2 ∈ JαK, then ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 ⇒ ω1 ≤Ψ−α ω2
2.3 Improvement Operators
The idea of (weak) improvements is to split the process of an AGM revision
for epistemic states [7, p. 7ff] into multiple steps of an operator ˝. For such a
gradual operator ˝ define Ψ ‚ α = Ψ ˝n α, where n ∈ N is smallest integer such
that α /∈ Bel (Ψ ˝n α). In the initial paper about improvement operators [14],
Konieczny and Pino Pérez gave postulates for ˝, such that ‚ is an AGM revision
for epistemic states. Due to space reasons, we refer the interested reader to the
original paper for the postulates [14]. The following representation theorem gives
an impression on weak improvement operators.
Proposition 3 (Weak Improvement Operator [14, Thm. 1]). A belief
change operator ˝ is a weak improvement operator if and only if there exists a
strong faithful assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ such that:JΨ ‚ αK = min(JαK,≤Ψ )
Furthermore, the class of weak improvement operators is restricted by DP-
like iteration postulates to the so-called improvement operators [14], which are
unique3. Again, we refer to the work of Konieczny and Pino Pérez [14] for these
postulates, and only present the characterisation in the framework of total pre-
orders.
Proposition 4 (Improvement Operator [14, Thm. 2]). A weak improve-
ment operator ˝ is an improvement operator if and only if there exists a strong
faithful Ψ 7→≤Ψ assignment such that
if ω1, ω2 ∈ JαK, then ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 ⇔ ω1 ≤Ψ˝α ω2(S1)
if ω1, ω2 ∈ J¬αK, then ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 ⇔ ω1 ≤Ψ˝α ω2(S2)
if ω1 ∈ JαK and ω2 ∈ J¬αK, then ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 ⇒ ω1 <Ψ˝α ω2(S3)
if ω1 ∈ JαK and ω2 ∈ J¬αK, then ω1 <Ψ ω2 ⇒ ω1 ≤Ψ˝α ω2(S4)
if ω1 ∈ JαK and ω2 ∈ J¬αK, then ω2 Ψ ω1 ⇒ ω1 ≤Ψ˝α ω2(S5)
holds and the following is satisfied:
JΨ ‚ αK = min(JαK,≤Ψ )
3 Note that the notion of improvement operators is not used consistently in the liter-
ature. For instance, the improvement operators as defined in [13] are not unique.
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In the following section we use the basic ideas of (weak) improvement operators
as a starting point for developing the weak decrement operators.
3 Weak Decrement Operators
A property of a contraction operator − is that the success condition of contrac-
tion is instantaneously achieved, i.e., if α is believed in a state (α ∈ Bel (Ψ))
then after the contraction with α, it is not believed any more (α /∈ Bel (Ψ − α)).
As a generalisation, we define hesitant contractions as operators who achieve the
success condition of contraction after multiple consecutive applications.
Definition 2. A belief change operator ◦ is called a hesitant contraction oper-
ator if the following postulate is fulfilled:
if α 6≡ >, then there exists n ∈ N0 such that α /∈ Bel (Ψ ◦n α)(hesitance)
If ◦ is an hesitant contraction operator, then we define a corresponding operator
• by Ψ • α = Ψ ◦n α, where n = 0 if α ≡ >, otherwise n is the smallest integer
such that α /∈ Bel (Ψ ◦n α).
The following Example 1 shows a modelling application for hesitant belief
change operators.
Example 1. Addison bought a new mobile with much easier handling. She does
no longer have to press a sequence of buttons to access her favourite application.
However, it takes multiple changes of her epistemic state before she contracts the
belief of having to press the sequence of buttons for her favourite application.
We now introduce weak decrement operators, which fulfil AGM-like contrac-
tion postulates, adapted for the decrement of beliefs.
Definition 3 (Weak Decrement Operator). A belief change operator ◦ is
called a weak decrement operator if the following postulates are fulfilled:
Bel (Ψ • α) ⊆ Bel (Ψ)(D1)
if α /∈ Bel (Ψ) , then Bel (Ψ) ⊆ Bel (Ψ • α)(D2)
◦ is a hesitant contraction operator(D3)
Bel (Ψ) ⊆ Cn(Bel (Ψ • α) ∪ {α})(D4)
if α1 ≡ β1, ..., αn ≡ βn, then Bel (Ψ ◦ α1 ◦ ... ◦ αn)=Bel (Ψ ◦ β1 ◦ ... ◦ βn)(D5)
Bel (Ψ • α) ∩ Bel (Ψ • β) ⊆ Bel (Ψ • (α ∧ β))(D6)
if β /∈ Bel (Ψ • (α ∧ β)) , then Bel (Ψ • (α ∧ β)) ⊆ Bel (Ψ • β)(D7)
The postulates (D1) to (D7) correspond to the postulates (C1) to (C7). By
(D1) a weak decrement does not add new beliefs, and together with (D2) the
beliefs of an agent are not changed if α is not believed priorly. (D3) ensures that
after enough consecutive application a belief α is removed. (D4) is the recovery
postulate, stating that removing α and then adding α again recovers all initial
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beliefs. The postulate (D5) ensures syntax independence in the case of iteration.
(D6) and (D7) state that a contraction of a conjunctive belief is constrained by
the results of the contractions with each of the conjuncts alone.
For the class of weak decrement operators the following representation the-
orem holds:
Theorem 1 (Representation Theorem: Weak Decrement Operators).
Let ◦ be a belief change operator. Then the following items are equivalent:
(a) ◦ is a weak decrement operator
(b) there exists a strong faithful assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ with respect to ◦ such that:
there exists n ∈ N0 such that JΨ ◦n αK = JΨK ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ )(decrement sucess)
and n is the smallest integer such that JΨ ◦n αK 6⊆ JαK
From Theorem 1 we easily get the following corollary:
Corollary 1. If ◦ is a weak decrement operator, then • fulfils (C1) to (C7).
Furthermore, every belief change operator that fulfils (C1) to (C7) and (D5) is
a weak decrement operator.
This shows that weak decrement operators are (up to (D5)) a generalisation of
AGM contraction for epistemic states in the sense of Proposition 1.
4 Decrement Operators
We now introduce an ordering on the formulas in order to shorten our notion in
the following postulates.
Definition 4. Let ◦ be a hesitant contraction operator, then we define for every
epistemic state Ψ and every two formula α, β:
α ◦Ψ β iff Bel (Ψ • αβ) ⊆ Bel (Ψ • α)
With ≺◦Ψ we denote the strict variant of ◦Ψ and define α Î◦Ψ β if α ≺◦Ψ β and
there is no γ such that α ≺◦Ψ γ ≺◦Ψ β.
Intuitively α ≺◦Ψ β means that in the state Ψ the agent is more willing to give
up the belief α than the belief β.
For the iteration of decrement operators we give the following postulates:
if ¬α |= β, then Bel (Ψ ◦ α • β) =α Bel (Ψ • β)(D8)
if α |= β, then Bel (Ψ ◦ α • β) =¬β Bel (Ψ • β)(D9)
if α |= γ, then Ψ ◦ α • β |= γ ⇒ Ψ • β |= γ(D10)
if ¬α |= γ, then Ψ • β |= γ ⇒ Ψ ◦ α • β |= γ(D11)
if α |= β and ¬α |= γ, then γ Î◦Ψ β ⇒ β ◦Ψ◦α γ(D12)
Bel (Ψ ◦ α) ⊆ Bel (Ψ)(D13)
8 Sauerwald and Beierle
(D8) states that a prior decrement with α does not influence the beliefs of an
decrement with β if ¬α |= β. (D9) states that a prior decrement with α does not
influence the beliefs of an decrement with β if α |= β. The postulate (D10) states
that if a belief in γ is believed after a decrement of α and the removal of β, then
only a removal of β does not influence the belief in γ if α¬γ implies β. By (D11),
if γ and α do not share anything, then a decrease of α does not influence this
belief. By (D12), if in the state Ψ the agent prefers removing a consequence of
¬α minimally more than removing a consequence of α, then after a decrement
of α, she is more willing to remove the consequence of α. The postulate (D13)
axiomatically enforces that a single step does not add beliefs.
We call operators that fulfil these postulates decrement operators.
Definition 5 (Decrement Operator). A ◦ weak decrement operator is called
a decrement operator if ◦ satisfies (D8) – (D13).
On the semantic side, we define a specific form of strong faithful assignment
which implements decrementing on total preorders.
Definition 6 (Decreasing Assignment). Let ◦ be a hesitant belief change
operator. A strong faithful assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ with respect to ◦ is said to be a
decreasing assignment (with respect to ◦) if the following postulates are satisfied:
if ω1, ω2 ∈ JαK, then ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 ⇔ ω1 ≤Ψ◦α ω2(DR8)
if ω1, ω2 ∈ J¬αK, then ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 ⇔ ω1 ≤Ψ◦α ω2(DR9)
if ω1 ∈ J¬αK and ω2 ∈ JαK, then ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 ⇒ ω1 ≤Ψ◦α ω2(DR10)
if ω1 ∈ J¬αK and ω2 ∈ JαK, then ω1 <Ψ ω2 ⇒ ω1 <Ψ◦α ω2(DR11)
if ω1 ∈ J¬αK and ω2 ∈ JαK, then ω2 Ψ ω1 ⇒ ω1 ≤Ψ◦α ω2(DR12)
if ω1 ∈ J¬αK, ω2 ∈ JαK and ω2 ≤Ψ ω3 for all ω3, then ω2 ≤Ψ◦α ω1(DR13)
The postulates (DR8) to (DR11) are the same as given by Konieczny and Pino
Pérez [15] for iterated contraction (cf. Proposition 2). The postulate (DR12)
states that a world of ¬α which is minimally less plausible than a world of α
should be made at least as plausible as this world of α. (DR13) ensures that
(together with the other postulates) that world in JΨK stays plausible after a
decrement.
The main result is that decrement operators are exactly those which are
compatible with a decreasing assignment.
Theorem 2 (Representation Theorem: Decrement Operators). Let ◦ be
a belief change operator. Then the following items are equivalent:
(a) ◦ is a decrement operator
(b) there exists a decreasing assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ with respect to ◦ that satisfies
(decrement sucess), i.e.:
there exists n ∈ N0 such that JΨ ◦n αK = JΨK ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ )
and n is the smallest integer such that JΨ ◦n αK 6⊆ JαK
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Ψ1 Ψ1 ◦1 a Ψ1 ◦2 a
Layer 2 a¬b ¬a¬b a¬b
Layer 1 ¬ab a¬b ¬a¬b ¬a¬b
Layer 0 JΨK ab ab ¬ab ab ¬ab
Table 1. Example changes by two decrement operators ◦1 and ◦2.
The following proposition presents a nice property of decrement operators:
Like AGM contraction for epistemic sates (cf. Proposition 1) a decrement oper-
ators keeps plausible worlds; and only the least unplausible counter-worlds may
become plausible.
Proposition 5. Let ◦ be a hesitant belief change operator. If there exists a de-
creasing assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ with respect to ◦, then we have:
(partial success) JΨK ⊆ JΨ ◦ αK ⊆ JΨK ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ )
5 Specific Decrement Operators
Unlike improvement operators [14], there is no unique decrement operator. The
reason for this is, that if ω2 'Ψ ω1 for ω1 ∈ J¬αK and ω2 ∈ JαK, and it is
not required otherwise by (DR12), then the relative plausibility of ω1 and ω2
might not be changed by a decrement operator ◦, i.e. ω2 'Ψ◦α ω1. Example 2
demonstrates this.
Example 2. Let Σ = {a, b} and Ψ1 be an epistemic state as given in Table 1.
Then the change from Ψ1 to Ψ1 ◦2 a in Table 1 is a valid change by a decrement
operator. Likewise, the change from Ψ1 to Ψ1 ◦2 a from Table 1 is also a valid
change for a decrement operator.
We capture this observation by two types of decrement operators. In the
first case, the decrement operator improves the plausibility of a counter-model
whenever it is possible.
Definition 7 (Type-1 Decrement Operator). A decrement operator ◦ is a
type-1 decrement operator if there exists a decreasing assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ with:
if ω1 ∈ J¬αK and ω2 ∈ JαK, then ω2 'Ψ ω1 ⇒ ω1 Ψ◦α ω2(DR14)
The second type of decrement operators keeps the order ω1 'Ψ ω2 whenever
possible. We capture the cases when this is possible by the following notion. If
≤⊆ Ω×Ω is a total preorder on worlds, we say ω1 is frontal with respect to α, if
(1.) there is no ω3 ∈ JαK such that ω3  ω1, and (2.) there is no ω3 ∈ J¬αK such
that ω1  ω3. We define the second type of decrement operators as follows.
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Definition 8 (Type-2 Decrement Operator). A decrement operator ◦ is a
type-2 decrement operator if there exists a decreasing assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ with:
if ω1 ∈ J¬αK, ω2 ∈ JαK and ω1 is frontal w.r.t α, then ω2 'Ψ ω1 ⇒ ω2 'Ψ◦α ω1(DR15)
Example (continuation of Example 2). The change from Ψ1 to Ψ1 ◦1 a in Table
1 can be made by a type-1 decrement operator, but not by a type-2 decrement
operator. Conversely, the change from Ψ1 to Ψ1 ◦2 a from Table 1 can be made
by a type-2 decrement operator, but not by a type-1 decrement operator
6 Discussion and Future Work
We provide postulates and representation theorems for gradual variants of AGM
contractions in the Darwich-Pearl framework of epistemic states. These so-called
weak decrement operators are a generalisation of AGM contraction for epistemic
states. Additionally, we give postulates for intended iterative behaviour of these
operators, forming the class of decrement operators. For both classes of opera-
tors we presented a representation theorem in the framework of total preorders.
For the definition of the postulates, the new relation ◦Ψ (see Definition 4) is
introduced. While ◦Ψ is related to epistemic entrenchment [10], it can be shown
that ◦Ψ is not an epistemic entrenchment. The exploration of the exact nature
of ◦Ψ remains an open task.
The next natural step will be to investigate the interrelation between (weak)
decrement operators and (weak) improvement operators. One approach is to
generalize the Levi identity [16] and Haper identity [11] to these operators. An-
other approach could be the direct definition of a contraction operator from
improvement operators, as suggested by Konieczny and Pino Pérez [14]. For
such operators, after achieving success, a next improvement may make certain
models unplausible, while a decrement operator keeps the plausibility. While this
already indicated a difference between the operators, the study of their specific
interrelationship is part of future work. Another goal for future work is to gen-
eralize (weak) decrement operators to a more general class of gradual change
operators [17]. Such operators are candidates for a formalisation of psycholog-
ically inspired forgetting operations. An immediate target towards this goal is
to take a closer look at subclasses and interrelate them with the taxonomy of
improvement operators [13].
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A Proofs
This appendix contains full proofs for the two representation theorems and for
Proposition 5. These proofs rely on three lemmata which are also proven here.
Lemma 1. Let ◦ an operator satisfying (D1) to (D4) and ω ∈ Ω, then:
JΨ • ¬ωK = JΨK ∪ {ω}
Proof. The proof is analogue to a proof by Caridroit et. al [5, Lem 13.]. uunionsq
Theorem 1 (Representation Theorem: Weak Decrement Operators).
Let ◦ be a belief change operator. Then the following items are equivalent:
(a) ◦ is a weak decrement operator
(b) there exists a strong faithful assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ with respect to ◦ such that:
there exists n ∈ N0 such that JΨ ◦n αK = JΨK ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ )
and n is the smallest integer such that JΨ ◦n αK 6⊆ JαK(decrement success)
Proof. We proof the theorem under the assumption that the signature has more
than 2 elements, i.e. |Σ| > 2. For the (a) to (b)-direction, ◦ is an hesitant
contraction operator, and the corresponding operator • is defined. We define the
total preorder ≤Ψ as follows:
ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 iff ω1 ∈ JΨ • ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2)K
We show that ≤Ψ is a total preorder:
Totality Let ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω. By definition J(ω1 ∨ ω2)K = {ω1, ω2}, and therefore
¬(ω1 ∨ ω2) has at least one model and ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2) 6≡ >. By (hesitance)
there is an n (and we choose here the smallest) such that ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2) /∈
Bel (Ψ • ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2)). Therefore, either ω1 ∈ JΨ • ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2)K or ω2 ∈JΨ • ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2)K.
Reflexivity Follows from totality.
Transitivity Let ω1, ω2, ω3 ∈ Ω such that ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 and ω2 ≤Ψ ω3. We differ-
entiate by case:
– If ω1, ω2, ω3 are not pairwise distinct, then transitivity is easily fulfilled
(since ≤Ψ is reflexive).
– Assume that ω1, ω2, ω3 are pairwise distinct and for at least one 1 ≤ i ≤ 3
we have ωi ∈ JΨK. Then in each case it is easy to see that ω1 ∈ JΨK and
thus, by (D1), for all α it follows ω1 ∈ JΨ ◦ αK.
– Assume that ω1, ω2, ω3 are pairwise distinct and ω1, ω2, ω3 /∈ JΨK.
Towards a contradiction, assume that ω1 6≤Ψ ω3. By assumption of
ω1 6≤Ψ ω3 we have ω1 /∈ JΨ • ¬(ω1 ∨ ω3)K. By Lemma 1 we have ω1 ∈JΨK∪{ω1} = JΨ •¬ω1K. From (D7) we get JΨ •¬ω1K ⊆ JΨ • (¬ω1∧¬ω3)K
and by (D5) we have JΨ • (¬ω1 ∧¬ω3)K = JΨ • ¬(ω1 ∨ ω3)K, a contradic-
tion, since ω1 ∈ JΨ • ¬(ω1 ∨ ω3)K and ω1 /∈ JΨ • ¬(ω1 ∨ ω3)K.
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We show that ≤Ψ is a strong faithful assignment with respect to ◦.
(SFA1) Let ω1, ω2 ∈ JΨK. Then by (D1) we have ω1, ω2 ∈ JΨ • ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2)K.
Therefore by definition of ≤Ψ we have ω1 'Ψ ω2.
(SFA2) Let ω1 ∈ JΨK and ω2 /∈ JΨK. Then by (D1) we have ω1 ∈ JΨ •¬(ω1 ∨ ω2)K.
Towards a contradiction assume ω2 ∈ JΨ • ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2)K. Since ω1 6= ω2,
by ω1 ∈ JΨK we know that Ψ 6|= ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2). Thus, by (D2) we have JΨ •
¬(ω1 ∨ ω2)K ⊆ JΨK.
(SFA3) Follows directly from (D5).
We show that (decrement sucess) is fulfilled. We differentiate by case:
– Case with α ≡ >. Then J¬αK = ∅ and by definition of • we have Ψ = Ψ • α,
especially JΨK = JΨ • αK = JΨK ∪ J¬αK.
– Case with α /∈ Bel (Ψ). Then by (D1) and (D2) we have JΨK = JΨ •αK, resp.
Bel (Ψ) = Bel (Ψ • α). Then there is an ω ∈ JΨK such that ω 6|= α, thus, we
have min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ) ⊆ JΨK. We conclude JΨ • αK = JΨK ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ).
– Case with α ∈ Bel (Ψ). Then by (D1) we have JΨK ⊆ JΨ • αK. We show that
every ω ∈ JΨ • αK \ JΨK is an element of the set min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ).
First, by (D4) we have JΨ • αK∩ JαK ⊆ JΨK. Then every ω ∈ JαK which is an
element of JΨ • αK \ JΨK leads to a violation of (D4). Thus, we observe that
every ω ∈ JΨ • αK \ JΨK is an element of J¬αK.
Second, towards a contradiction suppose ω ∈ JΨ • αK \ JΨK such that
ω /∈ min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ). Let ω′ ∈ min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ), and therefore ω′ <Ψ ω. By def-
inition we have ω′ ∈ JΨ •¬(ω′ ∨ ω)K and ω /∈ JΨ •¬(ω′ ∨ ω)K. By (D5) we haveJΨ•¬(ω′ ∨ ω)K = JΨ•(¬ω′∧¬ω)K. Then by (D7) and by Lemma 1 we concludeJΨK ∪ {ω} ⊆ JΨ • (¬ω′ ∧ ¬ω)K. This shows JΨ • αK ⊆ JΨK ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ).
Suppose ω is an element of min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ) such that ω /∈ JΨ • αK. Without
loss of generality we can assume α 6≡ >; thus, there exists at least one
ω′ ∈ min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ) such that ω′ ∈ JΨ • αK. By definition of ≤Ψ we have
ω ∈ JΨ • ¬(ω ∨ ω′)K. Clearly ¬α = γ ∨ω ∨ω′, and thus, α ≡ ¬γ ∧¬(ω ∨ ω′).
Since ω′ ∈ JΨ • αK, we have Ψ • α 6|= ¬(ω ∨ ω′). Therefore from (D7) we
conclude JΨ • ¬(ω ∨ ω′)K ⊆ JΨ • αK and thus the contradiction ω ∈ JΨ • αK.
This completes the proof of JΨ • αK = JΨK ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ).
For the (b) to (a)-direction let ◦ be a belief change operator and ≤Ψ a strong
faithful assignment with respect to ◦ such that (decrement sucess) is fulfilled.
(D3) For Ψ and α let nΨα be the smallest integer such that JΨ ◦nΨα αK = JΨK ∪
min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ). By (decrement sucess) the existence of nΨα guaranteed. For
α 6≡ >, then α /∈ Bel
(
Ψ ◦nΨα α
)
and therefore ◦ is a hesitant contraction
operator.
Since ◦ satisfies (D3) the corresponding operator • is defined.
(D1) Follows directly by (decrement sucess).
(D2) Suppose Ψ 6|= α. Then, min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ) is non-empty and by (SFA1) and
(SFA2) we have min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ) ⊆ JΨK.
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(D4) Let γ ∈ Bel (Ψ) and therefore JΨK ⊆ JγK. Then γ ∈ Cn(Bel (Ψ • α) ∪ {α})
if and only if JΨ • αK ∩ JαK ⊆ JγK. By (decrement sucess) we conclude JΨ •
αK ∩ JαK = (JΨK ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ )) ∩ JαK = JΨK \ J¬αK. Clearly, JΨK \ J¬αK ⊆JΨK ⊆ JγK.
(D5) Follows by (SFA3).
(D6) By (decrement sucess) we have JΨ ◦ (α∧β)K = JΨK∪min(J¬αK∪ J¬βK,≤Ψ )
and we have JΨ ◦αK∪JΨ ◦βK = JΨK∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ )∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ). Further-
more, it holds that min(J¬αK∪ J¬βK,≤Ψ ) ⊆ min(J¬αK,≤Ψ )∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ )
and therefore, we have:
JΨ ◦ (α ∧ β)K ⊆ JΨK ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ) ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) = JΨ ◦ αK ∪ JΨ ◦ βK
(D7) Assume Ψ •αβ 6|= β. Then by (decrement sucess) and (SFA3) we have JΨ •
αβK = JΨK ∪min(J¬α ∨ ¬βK,≤Ψ ) 6⊆ JβK. This implies that min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) ⊆
min(J¬α∨¬βK,≤Ψ ). By basic set theory we get JΨK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) ⊆ JΨK∪
min(J¬α ∨ ¬βK,≤Ψ ). By (decrement sucess) this is equivalent to JΨ • βK ⊆JΨ • αβK
In summary, the operator ◦ is an weak decrement operator. uunionsq
Lemma 2. Let ◦ be a belief change operator. If there exists a strong faithful
assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ with respect to ◦ which satisfies (DR8), (DR9) and (DR11),
then for every Ψ and α ∈ L we have:
JΨ ◦ αK ⊆ JΨK ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ )
Proof. Let ω ∈ JΨ ◦ αK. If ω ∈ JΨK we are done, so it remains to show that
ω ∈ min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ) in the case of ω /∈ JΨK.
We first show that if ω /∈ JΨK, then ω ∈ J¬αK. Towards a contradiction
suppose this is not the case, i.e. ω /∈ JΨK and ω ∈ JαK. Then there a two cases:
1. There exists ω′ ∈ JαK such that ω′ ∈ JΨK. We easy conclude that ω′ <Ψ ω and
thus, by (DR8), we have ω′ <Ψ◦α ω. Due to the faithfulness of the assignment
ω /∈ JΨ ◦αK, which is a contradiction. 2. For all ω′ ∈ JαK we have ω′ /∈ JΨK. Then,
by using JΨK 6= ∅, for all ω′′ ∈ JΨK we must have ω′′ ∈ J¬ΨK. Thus, ω′′ <Ψ ω and
from (DR11) we get ω′′ <Ψ◦α ω. Again, due to the faithfulness of the assignment,
we have ω /∈ JΨ ◦ αK, which is a contradiction. So every ω ∈ JΨ ◦ αK \ JΨK is an
element of ω ∈ J¬αK.
Now we show that every ω ∈ JΨ ◦ αK \ JΨK is an element of min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ).
Towards a contradiction suppose ω ∈ J¬αK \ min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ). Then there exists
ω′ ∈ min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ) such that ω′ <Ψ◦α ω. By (DR9) we can conclude that
ω′ <Ψ◦α ω, which is a contradiction to the assumed faithfulness of the assign-
ment. uunionsq
Proposition 5. Let ◦ be a hesitant belief change operator. If there exists an
decreasing assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ with respect to ◦, then we have:
(partial success) JΨK ⊆ JΨ ◦ αK ⊆ JΨK ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ )
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Proof. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 2 and (DR13). uunionsq
Lemma 3. Let ◦ be a belief change operator, Ψ 7→≤Ψ a strong faithful assign-
ment with respect to ◦ and γ ≺◦Ψ β. Then γ Î◦Ψ β if and only if for each
ω1 ∈ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) and ω2 ∈ min(J¬γK,≤Ψ ) we have either ω2 Ψ ω1 or
ω2 'Ψ ω1.
Proof. The "only if" direction. By definition of ◦Ψ we have
min(J¬γK,≤Ψ ) ⊆ min(J¬γ ∨ ¬βK,≤Ψ ),
which impliesmin(J¬γK,≤Ψ ) ⊆ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ). Clearly, it follows that ω2 ≤Ψ ω1.
In the case of ω2 'Ψ ω1 we are done.
For the remaining case of ω2 <Ψ ω1 suppose there exists ω3 /∈ {ω1, ω2} such
that ω2 <Ψ ω3 <Ψ ω1. This implies that min(J¬γK,≤Ψ ) ⊆ min(J¬γ ∨ ω3K,≤Ψ )
and ω3 /∈ min(J¬γK,≤Ψ ). Thus, by definition we have γ ≺◦Ψ γ¬ω3. Similarly,
we have β¬ω3 ≺◦Ψ β , since ω3 ∈ min(J¬β ∨ ω3K,≤Ψ ) and min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) 6⊆
min(J¬γ ∨ ω3K,≤Ψ ). Note that this implies ω3 6|= ¬β. From the previous obser-
vations we conclude min(J¬γK,≤Ψ ) ⊆ min(J¬γ ∨ ¬β ∨ ω3K,≤Ψ ), and therefore
γ ◦Ψ β¬ω3. This leads to γ ≺◦Ψ β¬ω3 ≺◦Ψ β, which is a contradiction to γ Î◦Ψ β.
In summary it must be the case that either ω2 'Ψ ω1 or ω2 Ψ ω1.
For the "if" direction suppose that γ ≺◦ψ α ≺◦Ψ β. This im-
plies that min(J¬γK,≤Ψ ) ⊆ min(J¬γ ∨ ¬αK,≤Ψ ) and min(J¬γK,≤Ψ ) 6⊆
min(J¬γ ∨ ¬αK,≤Ψ ). Thus we have ω2 <Ψ ω3 for every ω2 ∈ min(J¬γK,≤Ψ ) and
some ω3 ∈ min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ). Additionally, we have min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ) ⊆ min(J¬β ∨
¬αK,≤Ψ ) and min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) 6⊆ min(J¬β ∨ ¬αK,≤Ψ ). Thus we have ω4 <Ψ ω1
for every ω4 ∈ min(J¬γK,≤Ψ ) and some ω1 ∈ min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ). Note that ≤Ψ is
a total preorder, and thus, we have ω2 <Ψ ω3 <Ψ ω1, a contradiction to the
assumptions of ω2 Ψ ω1 or ω2 'Ψ ω1. uunionsq
Theorem 2 (Representation Theorem: Decrement Operators). Let ◦ be
a belief change operator. Then the following items are equivalent:
(a) ◦ is a decrement operator
(b) there exists a decreasing assignment Ψ 7→≤Ψ with respect to ◦ that satisfies:
(decrement sucess), i.e.:
there exists n ∈ N0 such that JΨ ◦n αK = JΨK ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ )
and n is the smallest integer such that JΨ ◦n αK 6⊆ JαK
Proof. (a) to (b)-direction: As ◦ is an hesitant contraction operator, the corre-
sponding operator • is defined. We define the total preorder ≤Ψ as follows:
ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 iff ω1 ∈ JΨ • ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2)K
By Theorem 1 (and its proof) ≤Ψ is a strong faithful assignment with respect
to ◦ which satisfies (decrement sucess). We show the satisfaction of (DR8) to
(DR12).
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(DR8) Let ω1, ω2 ∈ JαK. Choose β = ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2) and therefore ¬β |= α. By (D8)
we have Bel (Ψ ◦ α ◦ β) =α Bel (Ψ ◦ β), which implies:
(2) JΨ ◦ βK =α JΨ ◦ α • βK
From (decrement sucess) we obtain
JΨ ◦ α • βK = JΨ ◦ αK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α)(3)
and
(4) JΨ • βK = JΨK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ).
Substituting (3) and (4) into Equation (2) leads to
JΨ ◦ αK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α) =α JΨK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ).
Now consider two cases:
– Suppose JΨ ◦ αK ∩ J¬βK = ∅. Due to the faithfulness of the assignment,
we conclude min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α) =¬β JΨK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ).
– For JΨ ◦αK∩J¬βK 6= ∅, from the faithfulness of the assignment we get JΨ ◦
αK∩ J¬βK = min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α). Then again, we conclude min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α
) =¬β JΨK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ).
In particular, we can conclude from both cases that:
(5) min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α) = min(J¬βK,≤Ψ )
Note that J¬βK has only two elements, J¬βK = {ω1, ω2} ⊆ JαK, and thus
information about the minima provides us the relative order of the two ele-
ments ω1 and ω2. So, from Equation (5), we can conclude that ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 if
and only if ω1 ≤Ψ◦α ω2.
(DR9) Suppose ω1, ω2 ∈ J¬αK. We choose β = ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2) and therefore, we have
¬β |= ¬α. By (D9) we have Bel (Ψ ◦ α • β) =¬β Bel (Ψ • β), which implies:
(6) JΨ ◦ βK =¬β JΨ ◦ α • βK
From (decrement sucess) we obtain
JΨ ◦ α • βK = JΨ ◦ αK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α)(7)
and
(8) JΨ • βK = JΨK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ).
Substituting (7) and (8) into Equation (6) leads to
(9) JΨ ◦ αK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α) =¬β JΨK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ).
Now consider two cases:
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– Suppose JΨ ◦ αK ∩ J¬βK = ∅. Due to the faithfulness of the assignment,
we conclude min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α) =¬β JΨK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ).
– For JΨ ◦αK∩J¬βK 6= ∅, from the faithfulness of the assignment we get JΨ ◦
αK∩ J¬βK = min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α). Then again, we conclude min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α
) =¬β JΨK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ).
In both cases we can conclude:
(10) min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α) = min(J¬βK,≤Ψ )
Note that J¬βK has only two elements, J¬βK = {ω1, ω2} ⊆ J¬αK, and thus
information about the minima provides us the relative order of the two ele-
ments ω1 and ω2. So, from Equation (10), we can conclude that ω1 ≤Ψ ω2 if
and only if ω1 ≤Ψ◦α ω2.
(DR10) First, observe that the proof of satisfaction of (DR8), (DR9), (DR11)
and (DR13) are independent from showing (DR10), and hence we can safely
assume their satisfaction. By Lemma 2, ◦ fulfils (partial success), i.e.:
JΨK ⊆ JΨ ◦ αK ⊆ JΨK ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ )
Let ω1 ∈ J¬αK and ω2 ∈ JαK and ω2 <Ψ◦α ω1 and β = ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2). Then
ω2 ∈ JΨ ◦ α • βK and ω1 /∈ JΨ ◦ α • βK. We show that ω2 <Ψ ω1. This is
the case if ω1 6∈ JΨ • βK and ω2 ∈ JΨ • βK. By (partial success) ω1 is not an
element of JΨK. Since JΨ •βK = JΨK∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ), it remains to show that
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) = {ω2}. We have two cases:
1. For min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) = {ω2} we conclude directly ω2 <Ψ ω1.
2. Now consider the case of ω1 ∈ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ), and therefore ω1 ∈ JΨ •βK.
Let γ = γ′∨α, where γ′ is a formula such that JγK = JΨ ◦α•βK. Observe
now that ω1 6|= γ and that we have chosen γ and β such that α |= γ.
From Ψ ◦ α • β |= γ we conclude Ψ • β |= γ by (D10), a contradiction to
ω1 ∈ JΨ • βK.
In summary, it must be the case that ω2 <Ψ ω1 and thus, we have shown
the satisfaction of (DR10).
(DR11) Suppose ω1 ∈ J¬αK, ω2 ∈ JαK and ω1 <Ψ ω2. We want to show
ω1 <Ψ◦α ω2. For this purpose let β = ¬(ω1 ∨ ω2). Since Ψ 7→≤Ψ is a faithful
assignment it must be the case that ω2 /∈ JΨK. By use of (decrement sucess)
we can conclude that ω2 /∈ JΨ • βK and ω1 ∈ JΨ • βK. Now let γ = γ′ ∨ ¬α,
where γ′ is a formula such that JΨ • βK ∪ {ω1} = JγK. Note that ¬α |= γ
and ω2 6|= γ. By using (D11) we conclude Ψ ◦ α • β |= γ. This implies that
ω2 /∈ JΨ ◦ α • βK. Note that by J¬βK = {ω1, ω2} and (decrement sucess) it
must be the case that ω1 ∈ JΨ ◦ α • βK or ω2 ∈ JΨ ◦ α • βK, leaving the only
option ω1 ∈ JΨ ◦ α • βK. In summary, we get ω1 <Ψ◦α ω2.
(DR12) Let ω2 Ψ ω1 with ω2 |= α and ω1 |= ¬α. This means ω2 <Ψ ω1 and
there exists no ω3 such that ω2 <Ψ ω3 <Ψ ω1. To show that ω1 ≤Ψ◦α ω2, let
γ = ¬ω2 ∨ ¬α and β = ¬ω1 ∨ α.. Then, we have ¬α |= γ and α |= β, and
min(Jω2αK,≤Ψ ) = min(Jω2K,≤Ψ ) ⊆ min(Jω2 ∨ ω1K,≤Ψ )
min(Jω1¬αK,≤Ψ ) = min(Jω1K,≤Ψ ) 6⊆ min(Jω2 ∨ ω1K,≤Ψ ).
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Clearly, this is equivalent to ω2 ≺Ψ ω1. Moreover, by Lemma 3 we have
ω2 ÎΨ ω1, and thus by (D12), we have ω1 Ψ◦α ω2. By definition we have
min(Jω1K,≤Ψ ) ⊆ min(Jω2 ∨ ω1K,≤Ψ )
from which it is easy to conclude that ω1 ≤Ψ◦α ω2.
(DR13) Let ω1J¬αK and ω2 ∈ JαK such that ω2 ≤Ψ ω3 for all ω3. Then ω2 ∈ JΨK
and thus ω2 ∈ JΨ ◦ αK by (D13). Clearly, then we have ω2 ≤Ψ◦α ω1.
(b) to (a)-direction: Suppose that Ψ 7→≤Ψ is a decreasing assignment with re-
spect to ◦. By Theorem 1, the belief change operator ◦ fulfils (D1) – (D7). We
show the satisfaction of (D8) to (D13).
(D8) Let ¬β |= α. By (decrement sucess) we have to show JΨK ∪
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) =α JΨ ◦ αK ∪ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α). Then, by assumption,
Lemma 2 and (DR8) and (DR13), it is easy to see that min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) =
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α).
(D9) Let ¬β |= ¬α. By (decrement sucess) we have to show JΨK ∪
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) = JΨ ◦ αK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α). Then, by assumption, Lemma
2 and (DR9), it is easy to see that min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) = min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α).
(D10) Let α |= γ and Ψ ◦ α • β |= γ. By Proposition (5) we conclude JΨK ⊆ JγK
and min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α) ⊆ JγK. Remember that ◦ satisfies (decrement sucess)
and therefore, JΨ • βK = JΨK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ). Now let ω1 ∈ J¬βK such that
ω1 /∈ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α). We show that ω1 /∈ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) or ω1 |= γ. Let
ω2 ∈ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α) and thus, ω2 <Ψ◦α ω1. We differentiate by case:
1. For ω1 ∈ JαK we conclude ω1 |= γ directly from α |= γ.
2. In the case of ω1 ∈ J¬αK and ω2 ∈ JαK we conclude ω2 <Ψ ω1 by
contraposition of (DR10).
3. In the remaining case of ω1, ω2 ∈ J¬αK it is easy to conclude by (DR9)
that ω2 <Ψ ω1.
This shows that either ω2 <Ψ ω1 or ω1 |= γ, leading to the conclusion that
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) ⊆ JγK. In summary we have JΨ •βK = JΨK∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) ⊆JγK.
(D11) Let ¬α |= γ and Ψ •β |= γ. We want to show Ψ ◦α•β |= γ. By satisfaction
of (decrement sucess) we have
(11) JΨ • βK = JΨK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) ⊆ JγK
and by Lemma 2 and (decrement sucess) we have
JΨ ◦ α • βK = JΨ ◦ αK ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α),(12) JΨ ◦ α • βK ⊆ JΨK ∪min(J¬αK,≤Ψ ) ∪min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α).(13)
We show that every ω ∈ JΨ ◦ α • βK is a model of γ.
– If ω ∈ JΨK, then by Equation (11) we have ω |= γ.
– For ω ∈ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α) assume that ω |= ¬γ. For ω |= ¬α, we directly
conclude ω |= γ from ¬α |= γ. Therefore we can assume ω |= α. Since
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) ⊆ JγK, there must be ω1 ∈ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) such that
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ω1 <Ψ ω. If ω1, ω ∈ JαK, then ω1 <Ψ◦α ω by (DR8). For ω1 ∈ JαK and
ω ∈ J¬αK we conclude ω1 <Ψ◦α ω by (DR11). Thus it must be the case
that ω1 <Ψ◦α ω, which is a contradiction to the minimality of ω.
– Suppose that ω ∈ min(J¬αK,≤Ψ◦α). Then, ω |= γ can be directly ob-
tained from ¬α |= γ.
From Equation (13) it follows that ω |= γ, and therefore Ψ ◦ α • β |= γ.
(D12) Let α |= β and ¬α |= γ, and γ ÎΨ β. We show now that β Ψ◦α γ, which
is the case when min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α) ⊆ min(J¬β ∨ ¬γK,≤Ψ◦α).
First, observe that min(J¬γK,≤Ψ◦α) ⊆ JαK and min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α) ⊆ J¬αK.
Thus for every ω2 ∈ min(J¬γK,≤Ψ ) and every ω1 ∈ min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) we have
ω2 ∈ JαK and ω1 ∈ J¬αK. Therefore, by γ ÎΨ β and Lemma 3 we have two
cases:
– In the case of ω2 ÎΨ ω1 we conclude by (DR12) that ω1 ≤Ψ◦α ω2.
– In the case of ω2 'Ψ ω1 we have ω1 ≤Ψ ω2, and hence, by (DR10), we
have ω1 ≤Ψ◦α ω2.
From (DR8) and (DR9) we get min(J¬γK,≤Ψ ) = min(J¬γK,≤Ψ◦α) and
min(J¬βK,≤Ψ ) = min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α). In summary, we have min(J¬βK,≤Ψ◦α
) ⊆ min(J¬β ∨ ¬γK,≤Ψ◦α), which is equivalent to β Ψ◦α γ.
(D13) Let ω ∈ JΨK. If ω ∈ JαK, then by (DR13) and (DR8) we have ω ∈ JΨ ◦αK.
In the case of ω ∈ J¬αK we have ω ∈ JΨ ◦ αK by (DR9) and (DR10).
In summary, Ψ 7→≤Ψ is a decreasing assignment. uunionsq
